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INTRODUCTION 
rohibitionist drug policies have not only failed to achieve their 
stated objectives of reducing drug consumption and improving 
public health, but they have also caused or contributed to remarkably 
high levels of death, disease, crime, corruption, violence, 
incarceration, and a vast and destructive underground market. This 
Article focuses on the illicit drug markets generated by prohibition 
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and their attendant harms, especially the widespread violence 
currently afflicting many drug transit and producer countries like 
Mexico, the nations of Central America, and Colombia. It 
recommends major policy shifts away from prohibition and towards 
regulatory alternatives in order to diminish the size and profitability 
of illegal drug markets and, in turn, the power of violent trafficking 
organizations. 
I 
PROHIBITION’S DEVASTATING IMPACT ON LATIN AMERICA 
The global system of prohibition1 has failed to curb the supply of, 
and demand for, currently prohibited substances. The United States, 
for example, arrests 1.5 million people annually,2 and in 2011, almost 
500,000 people were incarcerated3 for drug law violations. However, 
most illicit drugs remain widely available and consumed at fairly 
stable rates.4 The harms of drug misuse, meanwhile, are often 
significantly amplified due to the criminalization of drug use,5 and the 
	
1 The United States has been the principal exporter of drug prohibition around the 
world, advocating for repressive drug laws in nearly every country. See, e.g., PETER 
ANDREAS & ETHAN NADELMANN, POLICING THE GLOBE: ORIGINS AND 
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIME CONTROL 42–45 (2006). 
2 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011, at 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.   
-2011/persons-arrested/arrestmain_final.pdf. 
3 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS: STATE AND FEDERAL 
PRISON POPULATION, 1925–2011, at 2 (2012). 
4 See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERV., RESULTS FROM THE 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND 
HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 1–2 (2012) [hereinafter NATIONAL SURVEY] 
(finding that “[i]n 2011, an estimated 22.5 million Americans aged 12 or older were 
current (past month) illicit drug users,” representing 8.7% of the population; in 2002, by 
contrast, there were 19.5 million current users, or 8.3% of the population. While the survey 
shows that use of some drugs, notably cocaine, has been declining in the United States, use 
of illicit drugs overall has increased, and use of some specific drugs, especially marijuana, 
has increased); see also U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2012, 
11 (2012) [hereinafter UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 2012] (showing that while cocaine 
use and the size of the cocaine market have declined in the United States, cocaine use and 
cocaine markets have increased in Europe and Latin American countries like Brazil). 
5 The criminalization of drug use, aggressive drug law enforcement practices, and the 
resulting fear of arrest encourages high-risk behaviors, such as poly-drug use and binging, 
and drive many people who inject drugs into unhygienic, unsupervised environments, 
where HIV risks are greatly elevated, and away from HIV testing, prevention and other 
public health services. See Corey S. Davis et al., Effects of an Intensive Street-Level Police 
Intervention on Syringe Exchange Program Use in Philadelphia, Pa, 95 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 233, 233–34 (2005); Samuel R. Friedman et al., Drug Arrests and Injection Drug 
Deterrence, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 344, 344 (2011). Fear of arrest is also the most 
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racially disparate enforcement of drug laws in the United States has 
led to the mass incarceration of people of color.6 These failures have 
come with a price tag conservatively estimated at $1 trillion since 
Richard Nixon declared the modern War on Drugs.7 
For the United States’s neighbors to the south, prohibition’s 
failures manifest primarily in the creation of immense underground 
markets that generate endemic crime, corruption, and violence.8 
Antonio Maria Costa, former head of the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC), admitted that the global prohibition 
regime has created many serious “unintended consequences,” 
foremost among which is “a huge criminal black market that now 
thrives in order to get prohibited substances from producers to 
consumers . . . the financial incentives to enter this market are 
enormous. There is no shortage of criminals competing to claw out a 
share of a market in which hundred fold increases in price from 
production to retail are not uncommon.”9 According to UNODC, the 
global drug market is consistently estimated to be worth more than 
$300 billion—or roughly one percent of the annual global economy;10 
	
common reason that witnesses to an overdose do not immediately call 911. See Peter J. 
Davidson et al., Witnessing Heroin-Related Overdoses: The Experiences of Young 
Injectors in San Francisco, 97 ADDICTION 1511, 1515 (2002). 
6 See generally Michele Alexandre, First Comes Legalization, Then Comes What? Tips 
to Washington and Colorado to Help Break the Cycle of Selective Prosecution and 
Disproportionate Sentencing, 91 OR. L. REV. 1253 (2013); Ernest Drucker, Drug Law, 
Mass Incarceration, and Public Health, 91 OR. L. REV. 1097 (2013). 
7 See Martha Mendoza, US War on Drugs Has Met None of Its Goals, HUFFINGTON 
POST (May 13, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/13/us-war-on-drugs-has    -
met-n_n_575351.html. Average annual drug war spending in the U.S. totals roughly $51 
billion. See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, 2012 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
STRATEGY 19 (2012) (revealing federal spending amounts to roughly $26 billion); 
JEFFREY A. MIRON & KATHERINE WALDOCK, CATO INST., THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF 
ENDING DRUG PROHIBITION 1 (2010) (showing state and local spending on prohibition 
enforcement totals more than $25 billion). 
8 See, e.g., PHILIP KEEFER ET AL., INNOCENT BYSTANDERS: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
AND THE WAR ON DRUGS 9 (2010). 
9 COMM’N ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, MAKING DRUG 
CONTROL ‘FIT FOR PURPOSE’: BUILDING ON THE UNGASS DECADE 10 (2008), available 
at http://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND-Session51/CND-UNGASS-CRPs 
/ECN72008CRP17E.pdf. 
10 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2005, at 127 (2005), 
available at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2005/volume_1_web.pdf (estimating that 
the retail drug market is dominated by the marijuana trade, which represents $113 billion 
of the estimated total). 
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and drug trafficking is now the world’s primary revenue source for 
organized crime.11 
The persistence and scope of the global drug trade show the 
absurdity of attempting to eliminate or significantly reduce drug 
supply. Yet for many decades, the dominant policy response of the 
United States has been to try to do just that: to reduce supply through 
a combination of domestic enforcement, interdiction, illicit crop 
eradication, and military aid.12 The effort has been largely fruitless, 
even futile. In spite of increasing arrests, seizures of drug shipments, 
and eradication of drug crops, prohibited drugs continue to be widely 
available and generally at cheaper prices and higher potency (albeit 
with short-term fluctuations).13 
Even where drug production or transit has been reduced in one 
country or region, these activities have simply been pushed into 
another country or region—a phenomenon known as the “balloon 
effect.”14 So-called “successes” in the drug war have merely resulted 
in the geographic displacement of drug production, drug trafficking 
routes, and power centers in the drug trade. Increased eradication 
efforts in Bolivia and Peru during the 1980s and 1990s pushed coca 
cultivation into Colombia, which became the world’s primary coca 
	
11 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, ESTIMATING ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS 
RESULTING FROM DRUG TRAFFICKING AND OTHER TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED 
CRIMES 5 (2011) (“The largest income for transnational organized crime seems to come 
from illicit drugs, accounting for a fifth of all crime proceeds.”); see also UNODC WORLD 
DRUG REPORT 2012, supra note 4, at 84 (reporting that “drug trafficking generates 
between a fifth and a quarter of all income derived from organized crime, and almost half 
of the income from transnational organized crime”). 
12 Roughly sixty percent of the U.S. federal drug control budget is destined for such 
supply-reduction efforts, while only forty percent is devoted to treatment, education, and 
prevention—or what is commonly known as “demand reduction.” The U.S. federal 
government has maintained this same skewed budget ratio, with few alterations, for 
decades. See OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, THE NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
BUDGET: FY 2013 FUNDING HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2012), available at http://www whitehouse 
.gov/sites/default/files/ondcp/fy_2013_budget_highlights.pdf. 
13 Over the past two decades, prices for cocaine and heroin have been on a long-term 
downward trajectory, despite occasional upticks due to short-term supply disruptions (as 
may have occurred recently with cocaine in the United States). See David A. Bright & 
Alison Ritter, Retail Price as an Outcome Measure for the Effectiveness of Drug Law 
Enforcement, 21 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 359, 361–62  (2010); Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter 
Reuter, How Drug Enforcement Affects Drug Prices, 39 CRIME & JUST. 213, 213 (2010). 
14 See COMM’N ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, supra note 9, at 10 (“It is often called the 
balloon effect because squeezing (by tighter controls) one place produces a swelling 
(namely, an increase) in another place, though it may well be accompanied by an overall 
reduction. This can be historically documented over the last half century, in so many 
theatres around the world.”); BRUCE BAGLEY, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ORGANIZED 
CRIME IN THE AMERICAS: MAJOR TRENDS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1 (2012). 
ROBELO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  2:27 PM 
2013] Demand Reduction or Redirection 1231 
producer.15 At roughly the same time, stepped-up enforcement in the 
Caribbean forced major trafficking routes to shift to Mexico and the 
isthmus of Central America.16 Mexican traffickers became 
increasingly important partners to the major Colombian cartels 
(Medellín and Cali); when these Colombian mega-cartels were 
dismantled, Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) became 
the ascendant actors in the drug trade.17 
In addition, supply-side policies aimed at killing or apprehending 
leading figures in DTOs tend to result in a process of dispersion and 
fragmentation that creates power vacuums and typically leads to more 
violent, smaller, and more nimble criminal organizations in a more 
competitive market environment—all of which, in turn, ratchets up 
violence. This type of fragmentation occurred in Colombia and, 
according to many observers, has been occurring in Mexico as well.18 
Militarized enforcement strategies simply push DTOs into other 
locales, as has been occurring with the current offensive in Mexico, 
which has driven DTOs to move or expand their operations to 
Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and other Central American 
counties—where they have found safe havens in smaller countries 
with weaker institutions, legacies of armed conflicts, and existing 
criminal networks. There is evidence that as trafficking becomes more 
	
15 More recently, evidence suggests that coca cultivation has decreased somewhat in 
Colombia, only to increase again in Peru and Bolivia. See UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 
2012, supra note 4, at 93. 
16 See RODRIGO SERRANO-BERTHET & HUMBERTO LOPEZ, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA: A DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE 12 (2011) (estimating that ninety 
percent of cocaine destined for the U.S. market is trafficked through the Central America 
corridor). 
17 See LUIS ASTORGA & DAVID A. SHIRK, DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS AND 
COUNTER-DRUG STRATEGIES IN THE U.S.-MEXICAN CONTEXT (2011). The U. S. 
Department of Justice estimated that Mexican and Colombian DTOs’ annual wholesale 
drug export revenues from the United States market ranged from $18 billion to $39 billion. 
See NAT’L DRUG INTELLIGENCE CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT 
ASSESSMENT 2009 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/ndic/pubs31 
/31379/31379p.pdf. Other estimates have placed overall Mexican DTO revenues from 
drugs exported to the United States at between $6 billion and $7 billion. See BEAU 
KILMER ET AL., REDUCING DRUG TRAFFICKING REVENUES AND VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: 
WOULD LEGALIZING MARIJUANA IN CALIFORNIA HELP? 31 (2010), available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP325.pdf. 
18 See BAGLEY, supra note 14, at 1; DAVID A. SHIRK, THE DRUG WAR IN MEXICO: 
CONFRONTING A SHARED THREAT (2011): CORY MOLZAHN ET. AL., DRUG VIOLENCE IN 
MEXICO: DATA AND ANALYSIS THROUGH 2012, at 1 (2013). 
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difficult along the Central America-Mexico corridors, DTOs will shift 
back to the Caribbean.19 
The effect has been intense bloodshed in parts of Mexico, where an 
estimated 70,000 people have been killed, 25,000 disappeared, and 
hundreds of thousands internally displaced in the past six years as a 
result of violence related to the trade in prohibited drugs.20 The death 
toll has claimed an increasing number of innocent civilians, 
journalists, law enforcement and public officials, and migrants.21 The 
Mexican security forces—sent into the streets to fight the DTOs—
	
19 CLARE RIBANDO SEELKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN: ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING AND U.S. COUNTERDRUG PROGRAMS 1 (2011) 
(“The Caribbean-South Florida route continues to be active, and although it is currently 
less utilized than the Central America-Mexico route, some observers have warned that 
activity along this route may surge once more in the near future.”). 
20 See E. Eduardo Castillo, Mexico Drug War: List of Missing Raises Doubts in Mexico, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 22, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/23/mexico   
-drug-war-missing-list_n_2355789.html (reporting “20,851 people disappeared over the 
past six years . . . [w]ith at least another 70,000 deaths tied to drug violence”); MÉXICO 
EVALÚA, INDICADORES DE VÍCTIMAS VISIBLES E INVISIBLES DE HOMICIDIO [Indicators of 
Visible and Invisible Victims of Homicide] 43 (2012) [hereinafter INDICADORES] 
(reporting by a Mexican nongovernmental organization, which recently estimated that over 
100,000 homicides occurred during the presidency of Felipe Calderón (2006–2012), and 
that at least fifty percent were associated with organized crime); ZETA Investigaciones, 
EPN en 100 días: 4 mil 549 ejecuciones [EPN in 100 Days: 4,549 Executions], ZETA 
(Mar. 11, 2013), http://www.zetatijuana.com/ZETA/reportajez/epn-en-100-dias-4-mil-549 
-ejecuciones/ (reporting in Tijuana-based weekly that more than 4,500 organized crime-
related “executions” have occurred in President Peña Nieto’s first 100 days in office—
continuing the trend of ex-President Felipe Calderón, under whose watch the magazine 
estimates 83,000 executions occurred). The number of homicides, disappearances and 
displaced people related to the war on drugs is likely far higher than those figures reported 
by government and media sources, for eighty to ninety percent of crimes in Mexico go 
unreported, uninvestigated, unsolved, and unpunished, and the complicity of security 
forces (who are often perpetrators of violence) has had a chilling effect on people coming 
forward to report crimes. See INDICADORES, supra, at 31–32. 
21 See CORY MOLZAHN ET AL., DRUG VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: DATA AND ANALYSIS 
THROUGH 2012, at 29–32 (2013), available at http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com 
/2013/02/130206-dvm-2013-final.pdf (estimating that at least forty-five mayors or ex-
mayors, seventy-four journalists or media-support workers, and hundreds of law 
enforcement or military personnel have been killed since 2006); see also Rafael López, 
Matan a 100 policías y militares en 3 meses [They Kill 100 Police and Military in 3 
Months], MILENIO (Mar. 1, 2013, 4:33 AM), http://www.milenio.com/cdb/doc/noticias 
2011/e33b3f03372f269bfdcac6449ccc75ae (reporting that nearly 3,000 “executions” have 
been committed by organized crime in the first three months of Enrique Peña Nieto’s 
presidential term, including 100 police or military officials); México registrar 11 mil 
secuestros de inmigrantes en un año: CNDH [Mexico has 11,000 Kidnappings of 
Immigrants in a Year: CNDH], LA JORNADA (Mar. 4, 2013), http://www.lajornadajalisco 
.com.mx/2013/03/04/mexico-registra-11-mil-secuestros-de-inmigrantes-en-un-ano-cndh/ 
(reporting that at minimum 11,000 migrants are kidnapped every year in Mexico, 
according to Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission). 
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have perpetrated widespread, well-documented, and grievous human 
rights violations, not unlike what has occurred in Colombia.22 And 
Central America has become one of the most violent regions in the 
world outside of active war zones.23 None of these costly efforts has 
made a dent in the drug trade.24 
The current surge in violence in Mexico and Central America—
indeed, most “drug-related violence”—is directly linked to systemic 
factors in the illegal drug market (e.g., competition over the 
exorbitant profits of the illegal market that prohibition has spawned)25 
or to aggressive enforcement of drug prohibition.26 Drug prohibition 
has enriched criminal organizations, much as alcohol Prohibition 
fostered and empowered organized crime. And since illegal 
	
22 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, MEXICO’S DISAPPEARED: THE ENDURING COST 
OF A CRISIS IGNORED 1 (Feb. 2013); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NEITHER RIGHTS NOR 
SECURITY: KILLINGS, TORTURE, AND DISAPPEARANCES IN MEXICO’S “WAR ON DRUGS” 
(Nov. 2011); see also INT’L CRISIS GRP., PEÑA NIETO’S CHALLENGE: CRIMINAL 
CARTELS AND RULE OF LAW IN MEXICO (2013), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~ 
/media/Files/latin-america/mexico/048-pena-nietos-challenge-criminal-cartels-and-rule-of  
-law-in-mexico.pdf. 
23 See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE 2011 (2011), 
available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/Homicide/Globa 
_study_on_homicide_2011_web.pdf. 
24 See UNODC WORLD DRUG REPORT 2012, supra note 4, at 1 (showing that global 
drug supply and demand are essentially stable); U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., DRUG 
TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS ADAPTABILITY TO SMUGGLE DRUGS ACROSS SWB AFTER 
LOSING KEY PERSONNEL 1 (2011) (“Generally, a steady stream of drugs are trafficked 
across the Southwest border (SWB) as long as they are available in Mexico . . . . While the 
continued arrest or death of key DTO leadership may have long-term implications as to the 
control and viability of a specific DTO, there is no indication it will impact overall drug 
flows into the United States.”). 
25 GABRIEL DEMOMBYNES, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA AND BEYOND BACKGROUND PAPER TO THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2011 (2011), available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2011/04/14266056 
/drug-trafficking-violence-central-america-beyond (“Whenever there are high rents from 
criminal activities and the costs of bribing are low, intensified sanctions and policing may 
actually generate the perverse consequences of promoting organized crime, widespread 
corruption, higher crime rates.”); see also SERRANO-BERTHET & LOPEZ, CRIME AND 
VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA: A DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE ii (2011) (concluding 
that “[d]rug trafficking is both an important driver of homicide rates in Central America 
and the main single factor behind rising violence levels”). 
26 All illicit markets have the potential to be violent, but not all are equally violent. 
Experts tend to agree that the degree of violence in an illegal market depends upon the 
degree of competition in the market and the intensity of prohibition enforcement. See 
FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL 
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA (1999); Jeffrey A. Miron, Violence and the U.S. Prohibitions of 
Drugs and Alcohol, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 78, 78 (1999); Peter Reuter, Systemic 
Violence in Drug Markets, 52 CRIME, L. & SOC. CHANGE 275, 275 (2009). Drug 
prohibition in Latin America in the last several decades has often satisfied both conditions. 
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businesses have no legitimate means of resolving disputes, violence is 
always possible and often the norm in illegal drug markets—much as 
it was during alcohol Prohibition.27 Moreover, evidence shows that 
aggressive enforcement strategies designed to disrupt drug markets—
such as those Mexico is pursuing today with the ready backing of the 
United States28—also intensify violence.29 
Demand reduction efforts have been no less of a failure,30 
especially in the United States, the largest consumer market in the 
world, whose demand is almost universally recognized as a major 
driver of the current security crisis in Latin America.31 While the 
United States ought to make a better (and wiser) investment in 
effective prevention and treatment programs, evidence does not 
suggest that the United States will be able to significantly reduce its 
national demand—at least not in the near term or to a sufficient 
degree to diminish the illicit markets for currently prohibited drugs.32 
	
27 See, e.g., ROBERT J. MACCOUN & PETER REUTER, DRUG WAR HERESIES: 
LEARNING FROM OTHER VICES, TIMES, AND PLACES (2001). 
28 See WYLER ET AL., LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ILLICIT DRUG 
TRAFFICKING AND U.S. COUNTERDRUG PROGRAMS (2011) (providing more information 
on the nearly two billion dollar U.S. military aid package to Mexico and Central America, 
known as the Merida Initiative). 
29 Dan Werb et al., Effect of Drug Law Enforcement on Drug Market Violence: A 
Systematic Review, 22 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 87, 87 (2011) ( “[T]he existing evidence base 
suggests that gun violence and high homicide rates may be an inevitable consequence of 
drug prohibition and that disrupting drug markets can paradoxically increase violence. In 
this context, and since drug prohibition has not meaningfully reduced drug supply, 
alternative regulatory models will be required if drug supply and drug market violence are 
to be meaningfully reduced.”). 
30 See PETER REUTER, HOW CAN DOMESTIC U.S. DRUG POLICY HELP MEXICO? 121 
(2011) [hereinafter REUTER, HELP MEXICO] (finding “Prevention remains largely an 
aspiration. Few of even the most innovative programs have shown substantial and lasting 
effect, while almost none of the popular programs have any positive evaluations. 
Treatment can be shown to reduce both drug consumption and the associated harms of 
drug dependent clients. However, given the chronic relapsing nature of drug dependence, 
it is unlikely that treatment expansion will have large effects on aggregate consumption. 
Enforcement, aimed at dealers and traffickers, which has received the dominant share of 
funds for drug control, has failed to prevent price declines; thus supply side efforts are 
unlikely to reduce the demand for Mexican source drugs.”). 
31 See, e.g., Arshad Mohammed, U.S. to Blame for Much of Mexico Violence: Clinton, 
REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2009, 7:54 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/03/25/us-usa      
-mexico-idUSTRE52O5RF20090325 (quoting former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton 
stating, “Our insatiable demand for illegal drugs fuels the drug trade”). 
32 Policy interventions have only a limited impact on demand, which is influenced to a 
far greater degree by consumers’ knowledge, fads, cultures, and mores. See, e.g., REUTER, 
HELP MEXICO, supra note 30, at 122 (“[P]olicy is only a modestly important factor in 
determining the demand for drugs. Culturally-formed attitudes towards the dangers and 
pleasures of drugs are much more influential. In addition, the use of drugs (apart from 
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Against this backdrop, regional leaders—whose nations have borne 
the brunt of prohibition’s “unintended consequences”—have begun 
calling for a fundamental transformation of global drug policy. In 
December 2011, the heads of state of Mexico, Colombia, Chile, all of 
Central America, and the Dominican Republic called on the United 
States and other consumer countries to either reduce their demand, or 
“if that is not possible, as recent experience demonstrates, then . . . to 
explore possible alternatives to eliminate the exorbitant profits of the 
criminals, including regulatory or market-oriented options to this 
end.”33 Several other leaders have echoed these sentiments.34 
II 
ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES: DEMAND REDIRECTION, SUPPLY 
REGULATION 
A. Legally Regulate Marijuana 
Marijuana has long dominated domestic law enforcement efforts in 
the United States: in 2011, there were 757,969 marijuana arrests, 
comprising half of all drug arrests and more arrests than for all violent 
crimes combined,35 and disproportionately affecting people of 
color.36 Yet marijuana is the most widely used illegal drug in the 
United States and the world, its prohibition notwithstanding. More 
	
marijuana) is an epidemic phenomenon. . . . The cocaine epidemic has been waning for 
many years as the number of regular users is declining and they are aging. The demand for 
cocaine has been falling for perhaps 20 years and, without the outbreak of a new epidemic, 
this trend is likely to continue.”). 
33 Declaración Conjunta Sobre Crimen Organizado y Narcotráfico [Joint Statement on 
Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking], Presidente de la República, 5 de Diciembre de 
2011 (Mex.), available at http://www.sela.org/attach/258/default/Declaracion_Conjunta 
_Sobre_Crimen_Organizado_y_Narcotrafico_-_XIII_Cumbre_de_Jefes_de 
_Estado_y_de_Gobierno_del_Mecanismo_de_Tuxtla.pdf (translated from Spanish 
source). 
34 See Juan Manuel Santos et al., Statement to the General Assembly of the United 
Nations (Oct. 1, 2012) (declaring, “[t]he United Nations should exercise its leadership, as 
is its mandate . . . and conduct deep reflection to analyze all available options, including 
regulatory or market measures, in order to establish a new paradigm that prevents the flow 
of resources to organized crime organizations”). 
35 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 2. 
36 See H.G. LEVINE & D.P. SMALL, MARIJUANA ARREST CRUSADE: RACIAL BIAS AND 
POLICE POLICY IN NEW YORK CITY 1997–2007 (2008); see also Andrew Golub et al., The 
Race/Ethnicity Disparity in Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 6 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 131, 159 (2007); H. Nguyen & P. Reuter, How Risky Is 
Marijuana Possession? Considering the Role of Age, Race, and Gender, 58 CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 879, 883 (2012). 
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than 100 million U.S. residents—about forty-two percent of the 
population—admit to having tried marijuana, and over 18 million 
people report using it in the past month.37 
Maintaining a prohibition on such a highly demanded commodity 
is impracticable and illogical—especially a commodity that health 
experts agree is objectively less harmful to individual and public 
health than most other intoxicating substances, legal or illegal.38  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, marijuana is a top revenue generator for 
Mexican DTOs; in fact, the U.S. Department of Justice asserts that 
“marijuana distribution in the United States remains the single largest 
source of revenue for the Mexican cartels.”39 Although other 
estimates place marijuana second to cocaine in revenues for Mexican 
DTOs,40 it is clear that a considerable proportion of DTOs’ profits 
derive from the marijuana trade. In the words of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), marijuana is “a cash crop that finances corruption 
and the carnage of violence year after year.”41 
Legally regulating marijuana, then, could dramatically shrink the 
illegal marijuana market and resultant profits to organized crime. 
Researchers at the RAND Corporation estimate that DTOs earn 
between fifteen and twenty-six percent of their illicit drug export 
revenues from marijuana; if the United States legalized and regulated 
marijuana nationally (or if one state provided legalized marijuana to 
the rest of the country, approximating nationwide legalization), then 
	
37 NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 4, at tbls. 1.24B and 1.24A. 
38 See ROBIN ROOM, CANNABIS POLICY: MOVING BEYOND STALEMATE 152 (2010) 
(“The probability and scale of harm among heavy cannabis users is modest compared with 
that caused by many other psychoactive substances, both legal and illegal, in common use, 
namely, alcohol, tobacco, amphetamines, cocaine, and heroin.”); In re Marijuana 
Rescheduling Petition, Docket No. 86-22 (Drug Enforcement Admin. Sept. 6, 1988), 
available at http://www.oregon.gov/pharmacy/Imports/Marijuana/Public/SRay/Court 
Docket86-22.pdf (finding that marijuana is “one of the safest therapeutically active 
substances known to man . . . In strict medical terms, marijuana is far safer than many 
foods we commonly consume”). 
39 Memorandum from David G. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., on 
Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of Marijuana, to 
Selected U.S. Attorneys (October 19, 2009) (on file with author). 
40 See KILMER ET AL., supra note 17, at 32–33. 
41 Drug Trafficking Violence In Mexico: Implications For The United States: Hearing 
Before the  S. Caucus on Int’l Narcotics Control, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Kevin 
L. Perkins, Assistant Director, FBI Criminal Investigative Division, and Anthony P. 
Placido, DEA Assistant Administrator for Intelligence). 
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Mexican DTOs’ illicit drug export revenues could decline by twenty 
percent, or between $1 billion and $2 billion.42 
Several states have, in fact, begun acting as laboratories for 
marijuana regulation. In November 2012, Colorado and Washington 
became the first political jurisdictions in the world to vote to permit 
the legal regulation of marijuana sales, cultivation, and distribution 
for adults twenty-one and older within their borders.43 A 2012 report 
by the Mexican Institute for Competiveness estimated that marijuana 
regulation in Colorado and Washington could reduce profits of 
criminal organizations in Mexico by $2.5 billion or more.44 Such 
estimates have prompted some experts to recommend that “the federal 
government should permit states to legalize the production, sale, 
taxation, and consumption of marijuana” as part of a comprehensive 
strategy to aid Mexico.45 In addition, medical marijuana is already 
legal in eighteen states and the District of Columbia, where more than 
one million patients now reside who are no longer purchasing their 
marijuana from the underground market, and, by extension, likely no 
longer financing organized crime through their consumption.46 These 
jurisdictions have also created a variety of regulatory models for the 
	
42 See KILMER et al., supra note 17, at 3–4. 
43 The two states have already begun implementing their laws, completely eliminating 
penalties for marijuana possession by adults, and are in the process of establishing 
regulations for the cultivation, distribution, and retail sale of marijuana to adults—a 
process to be completed in late-2013. 
44 ALEJANDRO HOPE & EDUARDO CLARK, SI LOS VECINOS LEGALIZAN: REPORTE 
TÉCNICO [If Neighbors Legalize: Technical Report] (2012), available at http://imco.org 
.mx/images/pdf/reporte-tecnico-legalizacion-marihuana.pdf. That study assumes the two 
states will supply the rest of the country and undercut the more expensive, imported 
Mexican marijuana—a “leakage” scenario that state officials in Colorado and Washington 
have pledged to prevent. See Letter from Governor Jay Inslee to the Honorable Eric 
Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Feb. 12, 2013) (on file with author) 
(stating Inslee’s intent to oversee “the development of a highly regulated system designed 
to prevent diversion of marijuana across state borders,” and “the creation of a system that 
minimizes the illicit market through price, access and convenience while simultaneously 
controlling the product”). 
45 SHIRK, supra note 18, at 26. 
46 See Russ Belville, America’s One Million Legalized Marijuana Users, HUFFINGTON 
POST (June 2, 2011, 1:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/russ-belville/americas-one 
-million-lega_b_869509.html (estimating between 1 and 1.5 million lawful medical 
marijuana patients nationwide); see also JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 219 (2012) (recounting that, prior to 
recent changes in Montana’s medical marijuana laws, fully half of regular marijuana users 
in the state were enrolled in the state’s program). 
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distribution and production of marijuana, with few discernible 
problems.47 
As medical marijuana spread from one state (California) in 1996 to 
one-third of the country today, recreational marijuana could follow 
the same pattern. Indeed, more than a half-dozen states have 
introduced legislation to regulate marijuana as of this writing,48 while 
advocates are gearing up in different states for ballot initiative 
campaigns in either the 2014 or 2016 elections.49 New York was the 
first state to repeal its laws prohibiting alcohol in 1923; a decade later 
when federal Repeal arrived, it had been joined by ten others—
suggesting that as more states abandon marijuana prohibition, the 
federal government may be forced to follow suit.50 Federal legislation 
has even been introduced to end marijuana prohibition nationally and 
defer the issue to the states,51 which nearly two-thirds of the 
population supports.52 
The effects of the watershed 2012 election spilled outside the U.S. 
borders as well. Within weeks of the polls closing in Colorado and 
Washington, legislators in Mexico introduced a bill to regulate 
marijuana in their country,53 questioning why their countrymen and 
women should continue dying to prevent a substance from reaching 
	
47 See Nancy J. Kepple & Bridget Freisthler, Exploring the Ecological Association 
Between Crime and Medical Marijuana Dispensaries, 73 J. STUD. ALCOHOL DRUGS 523, 
528 (2012) (finding no increase in crime in vicinities of dispensaries); see also Sam 
Harper et al., Do Medical Marijuana Laws Increase Marijuana Use? Replication Study 
and Extension, 22 ANN EPIDEMIOL 207, 207 (2012) (finding that medical marijuana laws 
have not resulted in increasing drug use rates). 
48 See Tim Dickinson, The Next Seven States To Legalize Pot: Why Oregon, California 
and More are Likely to Follow Colorado and Washington Toward Legalization, ROLLING 
STONE (Dec. 18, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-next       
-seven-states-to-legalize-pot-20121218. 
49 See, e.g., David Downs, A Grand Plan for California Pot Legalization in 2016 
Revealed, SF GATE (Jan. 28, 2013, 9:07 AM), http://blog.sfgate.com/smellthetruth/2013 
/01/28/activists-energized-for-california-pot-legalization-in-2016/; Kristen Gwynne, Who 
Will Legalize Pot Next?, THE NATION (Feb. 18, 2013), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/172538/who-will-legalize-pot-next. 
50 See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 48, at 185. 
51 Ending Federal Marijuana Prohibition Act of 2013, H.R. 499, 113th Cong. (2013); 
see also Marijuana Tax Equity Act of 2013, H.R. 501, 113th Cong. (1st. Sess. 2013). 
52 See Frank Newport, Americans Want Federal Gov’t Out of State Marijuana Laws, 
GALLUP (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159152/americans-federal-gov-state 
-marijuana-laws.aspx. 
53 Iniciativa de Ley General para el Control de la Canabis [General Law for the Control 
of Cannabis], la Atención a las Adicciones y la Rehabilitación [Care for Addiction and 
Rehabilitation], Cámara de Diputados [Chamber of Deputies], Republica de Mexico, 322, 
LXII Legislatura (2012) (Mex.). 
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consumers who, in the case of these two states, clearly want it. 
Lawmakers in Uruguay, already planning legislation to regulate 
marijuana, are now moving full steam ahead.54 
B. Regulatory Options for Harder Drugs: Medical Models for Serious 
Consumers 
Given marijuana’s prominence in the illicit drug trade and its 
relatively modest harms, it is a logical starting point for exploring 
regulatory alternatives to prohibition.55 The “harder” drugs, such as 
heroin, cocaine and methamphetamine, pose more difficulties for 
possible regulation. Yet the number of people who use these harder 
drugs is relatively small and pales in comparison to those who use 
marijuana.56 Furthermore, a small minority (roughly twenty percent) 
of the drug-using population consumes the majority (more or less 
eighty percent) of these harder drugs.57 These “heavy” consumers, in 
other words, represent the lion’s share of U.S. demand for heroin, 
cocaine, and methamphetamine.58 Offering a wide variety of effective 
	
54 See Proyecto de Ley sobre Canabis 2012 [Cannabis Bill 2012], Azamblea General de 
la Republica de Uruguay [General Assembly of the Republic of Uruguay] (2012) (Uru.), 
available at http://medios.presidencia.gub.uy/jm_portal/2012/noticias/NO_G830 
/proyecto_ley1.pdf. 
55 See REPORT OF THE GLOBAL COMM’N ON DRUG POL’Y, WAR ON DRUGS 2 (2011) 
(recommending “experimentation . . . with models of legal regulation of drugs to 
undermine the power of organized crime and safeguard the health and security of their 
citizens. This recommendation applies especially to cannabis, but we also encourage other 
experiments in decriminalization and legal regulation that can accomplish these objectives 
and provide models for others”). 
56 NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 4, at 14–16 (“In 2011, marijuana was the most 
commonly used illicit drug, with 18.1 million current users. . . About two thirds (64.3 
percent) of illicit drug users used only marijuana in the past month . . . An estimated 8.0 
million people aged 12 or older (3.1 percent) were current users of illicit drugs other than 
marijuana in 2011, including cocaine (1.4 million or 0.5 percent) heroin (281,000 or 0.1 
percent), methamphetamine (439,000 or 0.2 percent).”); see also KILMER ET AL., THE U.S. 
DRUG POLICY LANDSCAPE 5 (2012), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand 
/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP393.pdf (“The combined number of people 
meeting clinical criteria for abuse and dependence on illicit drugs other than marijuana is 
only 2.6 million, as detected by NSDUH, and is probably no more than 6 million when 
factoring in populations underrepresented in a household survey.”). 
57 KILMER ET AL., supra note 56, at 34. 
58 Other accounts have proposed different, criminal justice-centered approaches for 
dealing with this minority of “heavy users,” such as the coerced abstinence or mandated 
desistance programs implemented in Hawaii (Hawaii Opportunity Probation with 
Enforcement, or HOPE), which Judge Steven Alm describes in this issue. See Honorable 
Steven S. Alm, A New Continuum for Court Supervision, 91 OR. L. REV. 1181 (2013); see 
also Mark Kleiman, Surgical Strikes in the Drug Wars: Smarter Policies for Both Sides of 
the Border, 90 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 88 (2011); REUTER, HELP MEXICO, supra note 30. 
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treatments is essential to reducing the harms of drug misuse for this 
group of people—but, as mentioned above, most existing drug 
treatment programs have not been successful in reducing population-
level demand.59 
1. Heroin 
However, one form of treatment, narcotic replacement therapy, has 
proven consistently effective for dependence to heroin and other 
opioids. Also known as opioid-substitution or opioid agonist 
treatments, these pharmacotherapies decrease demand for illicit 
heroin and, by extension, shrink local heroin markets where they have 
been implemented.60 Yet few opioid-dependent people in the United 
States have access to these treatments; only nine percent of substance 
abuse treatment facilities in the United States offer specialized 
treatment of opioid dependence with methadone or buprenorphine.61 
The United States should immediately expand existing narcotic 
replacement therapies like methadone and buprenorphine, which one 
commentator predicted could dry up the U.S. heroin market for 
Mexican DTOs, representing some twenty percent of their drug 
export revenues.62 
	
Although an evaluation of the HOPE program demonstrated reductions in drug use and 
recidivism, there is no evidence regarding the long-term outcomes of HOPE participants, 
their outcomes in other domains (e.g., health, employment, social reintegration, etc.) or the 
generalizability of such programs. See ANGELA HAWKEN & MARK KLEIMAN, MANAGING 
DRUG INVOLVED PROBATIONERS WITH SWIFT AND CERTAIN SANCTIONS: EVALUATING 
HAWAII’S HOPE 49–50 (2009) (acknowledging in federally funded evaluation of HOPE 
that “The external validity of these results is questionable . . . Whether this structural shift 
can be accomplished in other jurisdictions remains an issue. . . . What happens to HOPE 
probationers once they complete probation, in particular, their long-term drug use and 
criminality is an important remaining question”). 
59 See, e.g., REUTER, HELP MEXICO, supra note 30. Some commentators hope that 
various legislative changes—notably the Affordable Care Act of 2010—will expand 
treatment availability and may have an impact on national demand. See KILMER ET AL., 
supra note 56, at 39 (“As heavy users represent a large share of total quantities consumed, 
this increase in treatment access could translate into a substantial reduction in demand for 
the illegal goods creating so much chaos in the United States and abroad.”). 
60 See M. CONNOCK ET AL., METHADONE AND BUPRENORPHINE FOR THE 
MANAGEMENT OF OPIOID DEPENDENCE: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW AND ECONOMIC 
EVALUATION (2007); CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., MEDICATION-ASSISTED TREATMENT FOR OPIOID ADDICTION IN OPIOID 
TREATMENT PROGRAMS (2005). 
61 See SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL SURVEY OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT SERVICES (N-
SSATS): 2011, at 61 (2012). 
62 Kleiman, supra note 58, at 93 (“Treatment offers benefits for some drug abusers; it 
more than pays for itself by reducing crime and other social costs of drug use. But . . . 
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While currently the gold-standard treatment for opioid dependence, 
methadone and other conventional narcotic replacement therapies do 
not work for everyone; at least five to ten percent of seriously opioid 
dependent people do not respond to available treatments.63 For this 
reason, several countries have gone beyond methadone and adopted 
pharmaceutical heroin-assisted treatment (HAT) programs,64 which 
have proven enormously successful and now operate in Switzerland,65 
the Netherlands,66 United Kingdom,67 Germany,68 Spain,69 
Denmark,70 and Canada.71 These programs allow for the provision of 
	
most people who need drug treatment . . . do not want it . . . The most common path out of 
substance abuse . . . [is] quitting without formal treatment. The one exception is opiate 
substitution for heroin addicts—such programs work, and people stay with them. 
Expanding the availability of substitution could cut into the approximately one-fifth of the 
US-Mexican drug traffic constituted of heroin.” (emphasis added)). 
63 John Strang et al., Supervised Injectable Heroin or Injectable Methadone Versus 
Optimised Oral Methadone as Treatment forCchronic Heroin Addicts in England After 
Persistent Failure in Orthodox Treatment (RIOTT): A Randomised Trial, 375 THE 
LANCET 1885, 1885 (2010). 
64 This paper focuses mainly on one outcome of HAT: reductions in street heroin use. 
For an overview of HAT’s many other salutary benefits, see Dan Werb, Heroin 
Prescription, HIV, and Drug Policy: Emerging Regulatory Frameworks, 91 OR. L. Rev. 
1213 (2013). 
65 See, e.g., Ambros Uchtenhagen, Heroin-Assisted Treatment in Switzerland: A Case 
Study in Policy Change, 105 ADDICTION 29 (2009); Ambros A. Uchtenhagen, Heroin 
Maintenance Treatment: From Idea to Research to Practice, 30 DRUG AND ALCOHOL 
REV. 130 (2011) [hereinafter Uchtenhagen, Heroin Maintenance Treatment]. 
66 See, e.g., Peter Blanken et al., Heroin-Assisted Treatment in the Netherlands: 
History, Findings, and International Context, 20 EUROPEAN 
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY S105 (2010). 
67 See, e.g., Strang et al., supra note 63, at 1886. 
68 See, e.g., Uwe Verthein et al., Long-term Effects of Heroin-Assisted Treatment in 
Germany, 103 ADDICTION 1 (2008) [hereinafter Verthein, Long-term Effects]; Uwe 
Verthein et al., Switching from Methadone to Diamorphine: 2-Year Results of the German 
Heroin-Assisted Treatment Trial, 46 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 980 (2011) [hereinafter 
Verthein, Switching from Methadone]; Christian Haasen et al., Heroin-Assisted Treatment 
for Opioid Dependence: Randomised Controlled Trial, 191 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 55 
(2007). 
69 See, e.g., Eugenia Oviedo-Joekes et al., The Andalusian Trial on Heroin-Assisted 
Treatment: A 2 Year Follow-up, 29 DRUG AND ALCOHOL REV. 75 (2010); E. Perea-Milla 
et al., Efficacy of Prescribed Injectable Diacetylmorphine in the Andalusian Trial: 
Bayesian Analysis of Responders and Non-Responders According to a Multi Domain 
Outcome Index, 10 TRIALS 70 (2009). Spain allows HAT during research trials only. 
70 Convinced by the impressive results from other countries, Denmark moved ahead 
with implementing HAT programs without conducting its own randomized controlled trial. 
See, e.g., Uchtenhagen, Heroin Maintenance Treatment, supra note 65, at 132. 
71 See, e.g., Eugenia Oviedo-Joekes et al., Diacetylmorphine Versus Methadone for the 
Treatment of Opioid Addiction, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 777 (2009) [hereinafter Oviedo-
Joekes et al., Diacetylmorphine Versus Methadone]. Canada allows HAT during research 
trials only. 
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pharmacological-grade heroin72 by prescription to a select group of 
heroin-dependent people who have not previously responded to other 
forms of treatment. Typically, patients receive injectable or inhalable 
heroin two to three times per day from a doctor in a clinical setting. 
Every published evaluation of HAT programs worldwide has found 
overwhelmingly positive outcomes in every index of importance: 
improved health, wellbeing, and social reintegration of people who 
use drugs, and reduced social costs like disease and crime.73 Most 
important for diminishing drug markets, every HAT trial has shown a 
marked reduction in street heroin use. For example, a Canadian study 
reported a two-thirds (sixty-seven percent) reduction in illicit drug use 
or other illegal activity among those receiving HAT.74 Similar 
reductions in illicit heroin use were reported from HAT trials in the 
United Kingdom (seventy-two percent)75 and Germany (sixty-nine 
percent).76 A recent, systematic review of HAT trials concluded, 
“Each study found a superior reduction in illicit drug use in the heroin 
arm rather than in the methadone arm . . . the measures of effect 
obtained are consistently statistically significant.”77 HAT is not only 
more effective at reducing street heroin (and other drug) use than 
methadone,78 but it has also proven to be more cost-effective.79 While 
	
72 The Canadian trial involved an arm of the study that received another opioid agonist, 
hydromorphone, instead of heroin; these subjects showed similarly impressive results. A 
second randomized trial in Canada currently underway is administering heroin as well as 
hydromorphone. See E. Oviedo-Joekes et al., Double-Blind Injectable Hydromorphone 
Versus Diacetylmorphine for the Treatment of Opioid Dependence: A Pilot Study, 38 J. 
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 408 (2010). 
73 See Benedikt Fischer et al., Heroin-Assisted Treatment (HAT) a Decade Later: A 
Brief Update on Science and Politics, 84 J. URBAN HEALTH 552, 557–59 (2007); Rebecca 
Löbmann & Uwe Verthein, Explaining the Effectiveness of Heroin-Assisted Treatment on 
Crime Reductions, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 83 (2009); see also Carlos Nordt & Rudolf 
Stohler, Incidence of Heroin Use in Zurich, Switzerland: A Treatment Case Register 
Analysis, 367 THE LANCET 1830, 1830–34 (2006) (finding that after high quality readily 
accessible drug treatment (including HAT) was provided, the number of new heroin users 
declined from 850 in 1990 to 150 in 2002 along with a reduction in HIV, crime and 
overdose deaths and a reduction in the quantity of heroin seizures). 
74 Oviedo-Joekes et al., Diacetylmorphine Versus Methadone, supra note 72, at 777. 
75 Strang et al., supra note 63, at 1891. 
76 Haasen et al., supra note 68, at 59. 
77 Marica Ferri et al., Heroin Maintenance Treatment for Chronic Heroin-Dependent 
Individuals, COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVS., Dec. 2011, at 10 (2011). The 
authors summarized their findings: “When accepted, this treatment may help them remain 
in treatment, limit use of street drugs, reduce illegal activities and possibly reduce 
mortality.” Id. at 2. 
78 See Verthein, Switching from Methadone, supra note 68, at 986. 
ROBELO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  2:27 PM 
2013] Demand Reduction or Redirection 1243 
HAT has been restricted to those who do not respond to methadone, 
evidence now shows it is effective even for people with no previous 
maintenance experience—suggesting it could be scaled up.80 Many 
HAT participants freely choose to move on to another form of 
treatment (like methadone) or to abstinence,81 while others continue 
to receive HAT treatment on a long-term basis, with lasting positive 
results.82 
Agonist replacement therapies represent the most effective 
approaches to demand reduction because they acknowledge that many 
dependent or serious drug consumers simply cannot or will not cease 
using their preferred substance of choice (or a close substitute)—
regardless of its legal status or the impact their consumption might 
have on other countries. HAT programs have been so successful 
precisely because they focus on reducing illicit demand—not demand 
per se—and channeling this demand towards a licit, regulated supply. 
HAT programs currently serve a subsection of the using population 
that is small, but which consumes a disproportionate amount of drugs. 
This approach has three fundamental goals: demand redirection, 
supply regulation, and harm reduction. 
Moreover, available evidence indicates that HAT programs can 
help destabilize local heroin markets. The one published article on the 
subject concluded that HAT participants “accounted for a substantial 
proportion of consumption of illicit heroin, and that removing them 
	
79 See Bohdan Nosyk et al., Cost-Effectiveness of Diacetylmorphine Versus Methadone 
for Chronic Opioid Dependence Refractory to Treatment, 184 CMAJ E317 (2012). 
80 See C. Haasen et al., Is Heroin-Assisted Treatment Effective for Patients with No 
Previous Maintenance Treatment? Results from a German Randomised Controlled Trial, 
16 EUROPEAN ADDICTION RES. 124, 124 (2010). 
81 See Jürgen Rehm et al., Feasibility, Safety, and Efficacy of Injectable Heroin 
Prescription for Refractory Opioid Addicts: A Follow-up Study, 358 THE LANCET 1417, 
1419 (2001); PETER REUTER, CAN HEROIN MAINTENANCE HELP BALTIMORE? WHAT 
BALTIMORE CAN LEARN FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES 17 (2009) 
[hereinafter REUTER, HELP BALTIMORE]. 
82 See Peter Blanken et al., Outcome of Long-term Heroin-Assisted Treatment Offered 
to Chronic, Treatment-Resistant Heroin Addicts in the Netherlands, 105 ADDICTION 300, 
300 (2009) (“Long-term HAT is an effective treatment for chronic heroin addicts who 
have failed to benefit from methadone maintenance treatment. Four years of HAT is 
associated with stable physical, mental and social health and with absence of illicit heroin 
use and substantial reductions in cocaine use. HAT should be continued as long as there is 
no compelling reason to stop treatment.”); see also Verthein, Long-term Effects, supra 
note 69, at 1 (“Street heroin use declined rapidly . . . as did cocaine use . . . HAT is 
associated with improvements in mental and physical health in the long term.”). 
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from the illicit market has damaged the market’s viability.”83 The 
authors further state that “by removing retail workers [who] no longer 
sold drugs to existing users, and . . . no longer recruited new users 
into the market . . . [t]he heroin prescription market may thus have 
had a significant impact on heroin markets in Switzerland.”84 An 
exploratory analysis of the benefits of implementing HAT in 
Baltimore, Maryland, concluded, “Enough evidence has emerged in 
the last 10 years to merit reconsideration of its potential for 
Baltimore, and the U.S. more generally.”85 
2. Methamphetamine and Cocaine 
The United States and other consumer countries should also begin 
to treat people dependent on illegal stimulants like methamphetamine 
and cocaine with replacement therapies, at least on a pilot basis. 
Currently, there are no approved pharmacotherapies for cocaine and 
methamphetamine dependence that have demonstrated the same level 
of efficacy as treatments like methadone, buprenorphine, and HAT 
have for opioid dependence.86 However, emerging research suggests 
that several medications already in use for the treatment of other 
conditions could serve as potential replacement therapies for illegal 
stimulant dependence, including dexamphetamine,87 
methylphenidate,88 modafinil,89 and other psychostimulants.90 The 
	
83 Martin Killias & Marcelo F. Aebi, The Impact of Heroin Prescription on Heroin 
Markets in Switzerland, 11 CRIME PREVENTION STUD. 83, 83 (2000). 
84 Id. 
85 REUTER, HELP BALTIMORE, supra note 81, at 32. 
86 See Kleiman, supra note 58, at 93 (“[T]reatment has little ability to reduce demand in 
the far larger markets for cocaine and methamphetamine.”). 
87 See Marie Longo et al., Randomized Controlled Trial of Dexamphetamine 
Maintenance for the Treatment of Methamphetamine Dependence, 105 ADDICTION 146, 
146 (2010) (“[D]aily sustained-release amphetamine dispensing under pharmacist 
supervision is both feasible and safe. The increased retention . . . together with general 
decreases in methamphetamine use, degree of dependence and withdrawal symptom 
severity, provide preliminary evidence that this may be an efficacious treatment option for 
methamphetamine dependence.”); see also DAN HUNT ET AL., METHAMPHETAMINE USE: 
LESSONS LEARNED (2006) (“The replacement of . . . dextroamphetamine for 
methamphetamine would ideally reduce problems related to crime, injection practices, 
family and economic issues, and health problems related to escalating illegal use.”). 
88 See John Grabowski et al., Replacement Medication for Cocaine Dependence: 
Methylphenidate, 17 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY (1997); Frances R. Levin et 
al., Treatment of Cocaine Dependent Treatment Seekers with adult ADHD: Double-Blind 
Comparison of Methylphenidate and Placebo, 87 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 20 
(2007); Jari Tiihonen et al., A Comparison of Aripiprazole, Methylphenidate, and Placebo 
for Amphetamine Dependence, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 160, 160 (2007) 
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literature on these medications for treating dependence to both 
cocaine91 and methamphetamine92 is quite favorable and growing.93 
	
(“Methylphenidate is an effective treatment for reducing intravenous drug use in patients 
with severe amphetamine dependence.”). 
89 See Ann L. Anderson et al., Modafinil for the Treatment of Cocaine Dependence, 
104 DRUG AND ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 133 (2009) (“[M]odafinil, in combination with 
individual behavioral therapy, was effective for increasing cocaine non-use days in 
participants without co-morbid alcohol dependence, and in reducing cocaine craving.”); 
Charles A. Dackis et al., A Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Trial of Modafinil for 
Cocaine Dependence, 30 NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 205, 205, 209 (2005) 
(concluding that “modafinil improves clinical outcomes when combined with psychosocial 
treatment for cocaine dependence,” and showing one-third of modafinil group attained 
prolonged abstinence from cocaine versus thirteen percent in placebo); C.L. Hart, et al., 
Smoked Cocaine Self-Administration is Decreased by Modafinil, 33 
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 761 (2008); J. Martinez-Raga et al., Modafinil: A Useful 
Medication for Cocaine Addiction? Review of the Evidence From Neuropharmacological, 
Experimental and Clinical Studies, 1 CURRENT DRUG ABUSE REV. 213 (2008) 
(“[M]odafinil has been shown to decrease cocaine self-administration. In addition, 
modafinil treated patient are more likely to achieve protracted abstinence than placebo 
treated patients.”); James Shearer, A Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Trial of Modafinil 
(200 mg/day) for Methamphetamine Dependence, 104 ADDICTION 224, 224 (2009) 
(“Modafinil demonstrated promise in reducing methamphetamine use in selected 
methamphetamine-dependent patients.”). 
90 See Marc E. Mooney et al., Effects of Oral Methamphetamine on Cocaine Use: A 
Randomized, Double-Blind, Placebo-Controlled Trial, 101 DRUG AND ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE 31 (2009). 
91 See John Grabowski et al., Dextroamphetamine for Cocaine-Dependence Treatment: 
A Double-Blind Randomized Clinical Trial, 21 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 522, 
525 (2001) (“[T]he first randomly assigned, double blind study . . . results point to 
improved retention and reduction in illicit drug use.”); Andrea R. Vansickel et al., Effects 
of Potential Agonist-Replacement Therapies for Stimulant Dependence on Inhibitory 
Control in Cocaine Abusers, 34 AM. J. DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE, 293, 303 (2008) ( 
“[M]ethylphenidate and modafinil . . . appear to be safe and effective in reducing drug 
taking, they may attenuate some of the positive subjective effects of the drug of choice, 
and it appears that they do not impair inhibitory control.”). 
92 See Rupert White, Dexamphetamine Substitution in the Treatment of Amphetamine 
Abuse: An Initial Investigation, 95 ADDICTION 229, 229 (2000) (“Dexamphetamine 
prescribing appears to be reasonably safe, and is associated with improvements in drug-
use.”); Ahmed Elkashef et al., Pharmacotherapy of Methamphetamine Addiction: An 
Update, 29 SUBSTANCE ABUSE 31, 31 (2008) (“Early pilot data are encouraging for 
administering D-amphetamine and methylphenidate as treatment for heavy amphetamine 
users.”). 
93 See, e.g., David V. Herin et al., Agonist-like Pharmacotherapy for Stimulant 
Dependence: Preclinical, Human Laboratory, and Clinical Studies, 1187 ANN N.Y. 
ACAD. SCI. 76 (2010); L. Karila et al., Pharmacological Approaches to Methamphetamine 
Dependence: A Focused Review, 69 BRIT. J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY (2010). The 
literature to date is not uniformly positive, however; some studies have shown mixed 
results or no benefit of the three medicines. Yet even these studies suggest that the agents 
discussed above show the most promise of all candidates, that further research is 
warranted, and that higher dosages may be required for stimulant-tolerant subjects. See, 
e.g., X. Castells et al., Efficacy of Central Nervous System Stimulant Treatment for 
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Medical models like HAT and emerging stimulant maintenance 
treatments are but one possible (maximally restrictive)94 approach to 
regulating illicit drugs other than marijuana—but they are by no 
means the only approach. Myriad options exist along a spectrum 
between total prohibition, on one pole, and an unregulated free market 
on the other.95 Ultimately, the appropriate regulatory model for each 
substance should be based on the relative harms and benefits of each 
substance.96 
III 
IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATION FOR RATES OF DRUG USE AND 
VIOLENCE 
A. Drug Use 
It is impossible to predict what effect various forms of drug 
regulation would have on levels of drug use. Empirical evidence from 
jurisdictions that have liberalized their drug laws demonstrates rather 
conclusively that policies which eliminate criminal penalties for drug 
possession or allow limited drug availability do not increase drug use 
to any appreciable degree.97 Some analysts have predicted that 
	
Cocaine Dependence: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled 
Clinical Trials, 102 ADDICTION 1871 (2007). 
94 Even then, these programs face legal and administrative—in addition to the obvious 
political—barriers to implementation. The importation and administration of a Schedule I 
substance, for example, would require approval of the federal government. See REUTER, 
HELP BALTIMORE, supra note 81, at 35. 
95 An emerging consensus is forming around several potential models for regulating 
drug production, distribution and consumption, including: (1) the medical prescription 
model, sketched out above; (2) supervised venues; (3) pharmacy sales; (4) licensed 
retailing; (5) licensed premises for sale and consumption; and (5) unlicensed sales. See 
Stephen Rolles, An Alternative to the War on Drugs, 341 BMJ 127 (2010). 
96 See, e.g., Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Basing Drug Scheduling Decisions on Scientific 
Ranking of Harmfulness: False Promise from False Premises, 106 ADDICTION 1 (2011); 
David Nutt et al., Development of a Rational Scale to Assess the Harm of Drugs of 
Potential Misuse, 369 THE LANCET 1047 (2007). 
97 See Louisa Degenhardt et al., Toward a Global View of Alcohol, Tobacco, Cannabis, 
and Cocaine Use: Findings From the WHO World Mental Health Surveys, 5 PLOS MED. 
1053 (2008); Harper et al., supra note 47; Caitlin Elizabeth Hughes & Alex Stevens, What 
Can We Learn from the Portuguese Decriminalization of Illicit Drugs?, 50 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 999 (2010); Robert J. MacCoun, What Can We Learn from the Dutch 
Cannabis Coffeeshop System?, 106 ADDICTION 1 (2011); MACCOUN & REUTER, supra 
note 27; Craig Reinarman et al., The Limited Relevance of Drug Policy: Cannabis in 
Amsterdam and in San Francisco, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 836 (2004); ROOM, supra note 
38; Mike Vuolo, National-Level Drug Policy and Young People’s Illicit Drug Use: A 
Multilevel Analysis of the European Union, DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 
ROBELO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2013  2:27 PM 
2013] Demand Reduction or Redirection 1247 
increased legal availability will not have a significant impact on use—
at least not for marijuana, which seems less responsive to changes in 
price than other drugs.98 Other studies have suggested that even 
legalizing a drug like cocaine would not lead to an “epidemic” of 
use.99 RAND’s study of possible marijuana legalization predicted that 
use would increase if marijuana were legalized, perhaps even 
significantly,100 but by how much is wildly uncertain and will depend 
on the regulations adopted and taxes imposed101—which should be 
high enough to disincentivize consumption but low enough to prevent 
a return to the black market.102 If utilized appropriately, such 
regulatory tools could keep potential increases in consumption at bay. 
In other words, an increase in use is possible but by no means 
inevitable. Given marijuana’s safety profile and relatively low abuse 
potential, the risks associated with an increase in consumption would 
be modest, but the benefits—at home and abroad—could be massive. 
The examples of alcohol and tobacco, despite their abundant harms 
and powerful lobbies, should provide some comfort to those who are 
apprehensive about regulation: adolescent use of alcohol—including 
current use, heavy drinking, and binge drinking—has decreased over 
the past decade, while tobacco use among youth as well as adults has 
been on a long-term decline.103 These public health gains owe to a 
	
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0376871612004887/1-s2.0-S0 
376871612004887-main.pdf?_tid=11fccd32-a2d9-11e2-b265-00000aab0f01&acdnat=136 
5706576_d7d89d5253ae450a0f4d0e941554819e. 
98 See Craig A. Gallet, Can Price Get the Monkey Off Our Back? A Meta-analysis of 
Illicit Drug Demand, HEALTH ECON., Jan. 10, 2013 ( “[B]ecause the price elasticity is 
smallest in absolute value for marijuana, advocates of legalizing marijuana could argue 
that the increase in supply resulting from decriminalizing the sale of marijuana would lead 
to a modest increase in consumption (absent demand shifts), compared with cocaine and 
heroin. Thus, the benefits of legalizing marijuana might outweigh the costs.”). 
99 See Norman V. Loayza & Naotaka Sugawara, Would Liberalization Lead to 
Epidemic Cocaine Consumption?, 19 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 1405 (2012). 
100 See BEAU KILMER ET AL., ALTERED STATE? ASSESSING HOW MARIJUANA 
LEGALIZATION IN CALIFORNIA COULD INFLUENCE MARIJUANA CONSUMPTION AND 
PUBLIC MARKETS (2010). 
101 See, e.g., Jonathan P. Caulkins et al., Design considerations for legalizing cannabis: 
lessons inspired by analysis of California’s Proposition 19, 107 ADDICTION 865, 865 
(2012). 
102 See Anne Line Bretteville-Jensen, To legalize or Not to legalize? Economic 
Approaches to the Decriminalization of drugs, 41 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 555, 558 
(2006). 
103 See SAMSHA CENTER FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH STATISTICS AND QUALITY, U.S. 
DEP’T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2011 NATIONAL SURVEY ON 
DRUG USE AND HEALTH, at Tables 7.29B, 7.30A (2012); LLOYD D. JOHNSTON ET AL., 
MONITORING THE FUTURE: NATIONAL RESULTS ON DRUG USE 7–8 (2013). 
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combination of prevention, education, treatment, harm reduction, and 
(perhaps imperfect) regulation—not prohibition. Furthermore, even if 
marijuana use were to increase—which is, again, by no means a 
certainty—overall harm would not necessarily increase. Emerging 
research suggests that many marijuana consumers substitute 
marijuana for more dangerous drugs, including alcohol, other illicit 
drugs, and prescription medications.104 If the increase in marijuana 
use was accompanied by a decrease in use of other, more harmful 
substances, it could actually result in net benefits—in addition to 
numerous other likely benefits of regulation.105 
B. Levels of Violence 
It is also impossible to foresee how regulation would affect levels 
of violence. Some analysts believe a short-term increase in violence is 
possible (as competition over a smaller market could intensify), but 
that violence in the longer term will decline.106 Some analysts point 
out that organized crime may further diversify into other activities, 
such as extortion and kidnapping, though these have been shown to be 
considerably less profitable than drug trafficking. As one scholar 
	
104 See Philippe Lucas et al., Cannabis as a Substitute for Alcohol and Other Drugs: A 
Dispensary-based Survey of Substitution Effect in Canadian Medical Cannabis Patients, 
(Nov. 12, 2012) (early online) ADDICTION RESEARCH & THEORY 1–8; Amanda Reiman, 
Cannabis as a Substitute for Alcohol and Other Drugs, 6 HARM REDUCTION J. 35 (2009); 
Helen Nunberg et al., An Analysis of Applicants Presenting to a Medical Marijuana 
Specialty Practice in California, 4 J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 (2011); Craig Reinarman 
et al., Who Are Medical Marijuana Patients? Population Characteristics from Nine 
California Assessment Clinics, 43 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 128 (2011). 
105 Not only is marijuana physically less harmful than alcohol, but it is socially less 
harmful as well. Marijuana shares none of alcohol’s association with violence, and while 
acute marijuana intoxication clearly impairs one’s ability to drive, evidence shows that 
marijuana-impaired drivers are much less of a threat to road safety than drunk drivers. 
CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 48, at 74–79, 133–37; Paul Armentano, Cannabis and 
Psychomotor Performance: A Rational Review of the Evidence and Implications for Public 
Policy, 5 DRUG TESTING & ANALYSIS 52, 53–56 (2013). In fact, a recent discussion paper 
found that traffic fatalities appear to have decreased in states with medical marijuana laws. 
D. Mark Anderson & Daniel I. Rees, Medical Marijuana Laws, Traffic Fatalities, and 
Alcohol Consumption 9–16 (IZA, Discussion Paper No. 6112, 2011). 
106 See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 48, at 177 (“[T]here are many caveats about the 
effect of marijuana legalization in the United States on violence in Mexico. However, the 
basic point presumably holds that, at least in the long run, marijuana legalization would 
make a meaningful, but not decisive, contribution to reducing the flow of funds to violent 
Mexican DTOs.”); KILMER ET AL., supra note 17, at 39–41; REUTER, HELP MEXICO, 
supra note 30, at 123 (“[I]n the long run, smaller consumption in the United States is 
surely going to lower the corruption and violence associated with drug trafficking in 
Mexico.”). 
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notes, given the profitability of the drug trade, “it would take roughly 
50,000 kidnappings to equal 10% of cocaine revenues from the 
U.S.107 While the American mafia certainly diversified into other 
criminal endeavors after the Repeal of alcohol Prohibition, homicide 
rates nevertheless declined dramatically.108 Combining marijuana 
regulation with medical regulatory models for heroin, cocaine and 
methamphetamine could strike a major blow to the corrosive 
economic power of violent trafficking organizations, diminishing 
their ability to perpetrate murder, hire recruits, purchase weapons, 
corrupt officials, operate with impunity, and terrorize societies. 
Moreover, these approaches promise concrete results—potentially 
significant reductions in DTO revenues—unlike all other strategies 
that Mexico or the United States have tried to date.109 Criminal 
organizations would still rely on other activities for their income, but 
they would be left weaker and less of a threat to security. 
Furthermore, the United States and Latin American governments 
would save resources currently wasted on prohibition enforcement 
and generate new revenues in taxes—resources which could be 
applied more effectively towards confronting violence and other 
crimes that directly threaten public safety.110 
Some have suggested that Latin American countries should 
abandon efforts to stop the flow of drugs or apprehend cartel bosses 
	
107 See, e.g., ERIC L. OLSON, CONSIDERING NEW STRATEGIES FOR CONFRONTING 
ORGANIZED CRIME IN MEXICO 5 (2012); see also JEREMY HAKEN, TRANSNATIONAL 
CRIME IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD v, 8 (2011) (comparing the international drug trade 
worth $320 billion and counterfeiting worth $250 billion, with the human trafficking trade 
worth $31.6 billion—roughly one-tenth the value of the global drug trade); STEVEN 
DUDLEY, TRANSNATIONAL CRIME IN MEXICO AND CENTRAL AMERICA: ITS EVOLUTION 
AND ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (2012) (“[F]or Mexican cartels total revenue 
from human smuggling is relatively small compared to the revenues from the international 
drug trade, which are probably in the range of $15 billion-$25 billion. The profit margins 
of the drug trade—estimated at 80 percent of the revenues—are also likely higher than for 
human smuggling.”). 
108 See KILMER ET AL., supra note 17, at 39–40. 
109 See SHIRK, supra note 18, at 18, 33–34 n.43 (reporting that a massive security 
buildup at the US-Mexico border, increased border interdiction and record levels of drug 
seizures likely reduced DTO revenues by only “a small fraction”). 
110 See MIRON & WALDOCK, supra note 7, at 1, 5, 6 (estimating that annual tax 
revenues from legalizing and taxing currently-prohibited drugs like alcohol and tobacco 
could total approximately $46.7 billion in the United States alone (of which marijuana by 
itself would likely account for $8.7 billion), while savings from expenditures on 
prohibition enforcement—in terms of police, courts and corrections—could total roughly 
$41.3 billion annually). That estimate is likely on the conservative side, as it does not 
include savings that would accrue to the treatment system or result from technical 
violations of probation and parole. 
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and should rather focus on confronting those traffickers who most 
frequently or visibly engage in violence. Known as “focused 
deterrence,” this alternative calls for a more strategic deployment of 
law enforcement resources to credibly target those traffickers that are 
most violent or dangerous—rather than focusing on drug trafficking, 
per se—in the hope of shifting participation of market actors towards 
less violent behavior.111 It would be reasonable and understandable if 
Mexico and other countries decided to change course and pursue their 
own security interests—which have little to do with drugs, and 
everything to do with violence—instead of subordinating their 
interests to those of the United States.112 But focused deterrence 
strategies and the more fundamental reorienting of drug policy 
described above are not mutually exclusive. These strategies should 
be pursued simultaneously. 
Regulating marijuana and other drugs will by no means be a 
panacea for the security crisis facing many Latin American countries 
today. Of course, there are a host of critical issues outside the scope 
of this Article that must be addressed, including vital institutional 
reforms (particularly of judicial and law enforcement institutions), as 
well as the consideration of new policies regarding firearms, 
migration, money laundering, and militarization.113 But drug 
prohibition remains a central cause of organized crime and violence in 
the Americas, and prohibition-related violence and corruption 
continue to confound efforts at institutional reform in many 
countries.114 Exploring regulatory alternatives to prohibition is thus 
essential to finding durable solutions. 
CONCLUSION 
As the drug war continues destroying families and communities 
throughout the Americas, governments and regional and international 
bodies must urgently devise a new drug control strategy to replace 
	
111 See, e.g., Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter, Towards a Harm-Reduction 
Approach to Enforcement, 8 SAFER COMMUNITIES 9 (2009); VANDA FELBAB-BROWN, 
FOCUSED DETERRENCE, SELECTIVE TARGETING, DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ORGANIZED 
CRIME: CONCEPTS AND PRACTICALITIES (2013). 
112 Franklin E. Zimring, Violence and Drugs: Divide, Then Conquer?, BERKELEY REV. 
LATIN AM. STUD., Spring 2008, at 40–41. 
113 See generally INT’L CRISIS GRP., supra note 22. 
114 BAGLEY, supra note 14, at 12 (arguing that “reform efforts can be, and often have 
been, stymied or derailed entirely by institutional corruption and criminal violence . . . the 
consequence of ignoring organized crime and its corrosive effects may well be 
institutional decay or democratic de-institutionalization”). 
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nearly a century of failed prohibitions. A new paradigm of harm 
reduction, demand redirection, and supply regulation merits 
immediate exploration. Such a paradigm, involving the policy options 
mentioned above, will likely mitigate the individual and social harms 
of drug misuse—and minimize the harmful consequences of drug 
policies—far more effectively than the current prohibitionist regime. 
Given the scope and intensity of violence in the region, and the 
incalculable human costs for those affected, all options must be on the 
table to bring an end to the disastrous War on Drugs. 
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